Democracy and judicial Independence by St. Marylebone, The Right Honourable the Lord Hailsham of
7
Articles •  Articles
Democracy and Judicial Independence
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD 
HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE*
One of the pillars of British liberal democracy is the independence 
of the judiciary; but the problem is how to reconcile judicial inde­
pendence with efficiency in the administration of justice and with 
public accountability. The former question, though of immense 
importance, has received ameliorative attention only in the last 
few years. The latter question has been resolved largely through 
the consistent, apolitical appointment of persons of high ability 
to the Bench. One useful mechanism to promote the continued 
smooth functioning of the judicial system in the U.K. might be 
the establishment of a Department of State concerned entirely with 
the administration of justice and judiciary.
Earlier in this trip I spoke on two sorts of democracy. The first, 
which I condemned as false, I labelled centralised democracy or elective 
dictatorship. I claimed that it is a view, of which the ultimate conclusion 
is a dictatorship o f the right or left, based upon two classical theories 
of British political philosophy, legal positivism and utilitarianism, which 
rejected, as “nonsense on stilts”, the view that law should be based on 
natural rights, natural justice, or objective criteria of right and wrong. 
To the other, of which I proclaimed myself an adherent, I attached 
the label “the theory of limited government”, and claimed that it 
represented the true, the older, doctrine o f Western philosophers and 
lawyers.
O f one thing there can be no doubt. The independence of the 
judiciary is a great bastion against the absolutist theory of democracy. 
It is older than Bentham and, in Britain, where it was first asserted,
♦Viscount Bennett Memorial Lecture, delivered on October 17, 1977 at the University o f New 
Brunswick Law School, Fredericton, New Brunswick.
8 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
it is one of the two foundations on which British freedom is based. 
From Britain it spread, but in a markedly different form, to the continent 
of Europe. It is, I believe, more important than ever today.
There is, however, a word of warning with which I must begin. 
My experience has been exclusively of British politics and, in legal 
matters, English law. Even if this were not so, good manners would lead 
me to express my opinions, give my examples, and expose my experience 
in British or English legal or political idiom. But I believe the problems 
to which I am drawing attention are universal to the West. The solutions 
may differ from time to time and from place to place. I hope that 
what I have to say may be o f interest to you, but its exact application 
to the Canadian scene must be for you to determine.
The course 1 am taking in this particular exercise is to raise 
some of the questions which I had to face as Lord Chancellor during 
my four years tenure of office in Mr. Heath’s Government. They are 
questions which I believe are too seldom asked, and if asked are too 
seldom identified as important. I am, of course, aware that there is no 
such official as a Lord Chancellor in Canada. Indeed, England is 
really the only place where a Lord Chancellor still exists since, although 
his title extends to Great Britain, a Lord Chancellor has no effective 
functions in Scotland, and the ancient but separate office of Lord 
Chancellor of Ireland has disappeared. Nevertheless, the same questions 
must, I believe, be considered and answered in any free society.
All these questions revolve round a single basic problem, indeed 
are different aspects of it. The problem is how to reconcile the 
divergent and to some extent inconsistent requirements of public 
accountability, judicial independence, and efficiency in the administration 
of justice.
The Act of Settlement, which signalised the final victory of Parliament 
over the Stuart kings, left the problem, except for judicial independence, 
effectively unresolved. The judges were freed from the threat of dismissal 
if they incurred the displeasure o f the Crown. But their appointment 
was, and still is, effected by the Crown’s advisers and for centuries 
was regarded as a reward for political reliability. The salaries were 
exempted from the exigencies of the annual budget and paid directly 
from the -Consolidated Fund; but though at one time, owing to the 
existence o f a gold coinage and the virtual nonexistence of direct 
taxation of income, they were relatively enormous, the number, rem unera­
tion and pension of judges have become in recent years an almost 
annual item on the Parliamentary agenda, an item which is almost 
always accompanied by feverish government whipping and, in the 
Chamber itself, violent left wing attacks on the judiciary, sometimes 
as a whole, and sometimes specifying individual personalities.
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The Act of Settlement therefore did not even solve the problem of 
public accountability and judicial independence, and it did not even 
purport to solve the problem of efficiency. Nevertheless, it gave 
rise to a cen tra l do c trin e , on both sides o f the A tlantic, 
admitted in theory if not always honoured in practice, that the 
judges are a separate branch o f governm ent, independen t of 
the executive and of the legislature. Even in Britain, where the 
in d ep en d en ce  o f one an o th e r  o f executive and  leg isla tu re  
has not survived the  grow th o f C abinet governm en t, the 
doc trine  o f jud icia l in dependence  still flourishes. It is this 
theory and its practical implications that I am discussing now.
But I must start with administrative efficiency, the least dramatic 
and, in terms of value, the least important o f the three requirements 
I have listed. All the same I would not recommend a free society to 
neglect it, as I suspect that most o f the Common Law countries 
traditionally do. Justice delayed, says the judiciary commenting on Magna 
Carta, is justice denied. But justice inefficiently administered is also 
justice denied, and usually justice delayed into the bargain. When I 
first became Lord Chancellor I was almost unaware of the absence 
of efficiency in our judicial system. Take, for instance, the physical 
provision of court buildings, the recruitment, management, remuneration, 
and career structure of ancillary staff, and the listing of cases. In my 
innocence I believed that almost any building would do for a court 
if it had four walls and a roof, a sufficiently comfortable seat for the 
judge, and sufficient space for counsel, the public, the press and, if a 
criminal court, for the jury and the accused. It is obvious, is it not, 
that this is an excessively foolish and superficial judgm ent. But, owing 
to the absence in England of adequate Parliamentary accountability, 
efficiency in judicial administration was, until recently, largely lost 
sight of. The vast ancillary staff has to be housed, paid, fed and 
cooked for, and given a proper career structure with sufficient avenues 
of promotion. There must be proper accommodation for the storage 
and availability of voluminous records. Libraries must be stocked, 
housed, and maintained. Quite apart from this, and, perhaps most 
importantly, in courts of lower jurisdiction, the offices are thronged 
with plaintiffs and defendants in various stages of litigation, often 
without the slightest idea o f what to do and how to do it and, in the 
smaller cases at least, without legal advice. When I first became Lord 
Chancellor, our higher criminal and civil courts in the provinces were 
largely administered by a peripatetic staff moving from town to town 
with the judge, finding their own sleeping accommodation as they did 
so, and carrying among other things many of the court records in their 
luggage. In practice, of course, the problem of listing cases so that 
they come in for hearing in an orderly flow as and when they are 
advertised, without undue periods of waiting for the parties, or keeping 
the extremely rare manpower resource — judicial manpower — waiting, 
dem anded a very high degree of professional skill on the part of the
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staff. But the judicial administrator was scarcely known and when 
attempts were made to introduce such an official they were often 
resented as interference with judicial independence. Such administration 
as was done in the High Court was largely supervised, and to some 
considerable extent actually performed, by the Lord Chief Justice, the 
Master of the Rolls, the President of the Divorce Division (as it was 
then) and the Senior Chancery Judge, together with their unqualified 
if intelligent clerks in the midst of pressing, voluminous and increasing 
judicial business. These distinguished men were not only badly over­
worked in consequence, but were also partly unaware of the skills 
and arts of the administrator; and, though by my time the suspicion 
and bad blood which had existed at the time of Lord Hewart and Lord 
Schuster between the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor’s 
departm ent had entirely evaporated, increasing arrears of work, 
particularly in the criminal courts were threatening to bring the whole 
system into disrepute.
The reason for this lay in the fundamental constitutional problem 
of reconciling efficiency with public accountability, and both with judicial 
independence. Constitutional lawyers are, as I have said, taught a lot 
about the gradual victory of Parliament in its long struggle with the 
Crown, through the control of finance, and the subordination of 
Ministers to votes of confidence in the Commons. But equally important, 
and far less carefully studied, is the independence of the judiciary 
from the executive. The problems underlying this important pre­
requisite of freedom have been long in coming to the surface, and have 
been far less carefully identified, owing to the fairly primitive solution 
which was established by the Act of Settlement. O f course, so long as 
judicial administration was thought of, as it still is in various parts of 
the Commonwealth, as a part time exercise for the judges themselves, 
this presented few problems. The cost was small. The salaries of the 
judges were provided for through the Consolidated Fund, and junior 
judicial posts lay within the personal patronage of the senior judges 
including the Lord Chancellor himself, a circumstance which, however, 
gave rise to two of the extremely rare judicial scandals in our annals, 
one in the 18th and one in the 19th century.
But with the rise and recent increase o f jurisdiction in the county 
courts, the enormous increase in crime, resulting in the multiplication 
of courts at the Old Bailey and the almost permanent sitting of the 
Assizes in Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool, the decentralisation 
of divorce, and the huge development of informal tribunals to act as a 
sort of specialised judicial arm in a wide variety of quasi-administra- 
tive matters, the problem had largely become insoluble on the old 
lines, and at the time of my appointment only seven years ago the 
chaos was rendered worse by the nonsense of having separate ju ris­
diction and administrative machines between assizes and quarter 
sessions. Even now the process of rationalisation is far from complete 
since, owing to the extreme conservatism of the profession and of
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backbenchers in the House of Commons in matters which they do not 
understand, Britain, or at least England, is still wholly without a 
rational system for courts of summary jurisdiction. These Courts are 
badly sited, often housed in unsuitable buildings without proper office 
accommodation, and without the simplest catering facilities. The staff 
are locally recruited and administered, a few still unqualified, without 
posting facilities or career prospects, and responsibility for them is 
divided between two central government departments, and two separate 
local organs, four authorities in all. This is largely the price we have 
paid for judicial independence and is wholly inconsistent either with 
efficiency or public accountability. None the less it is worth paying 
only so long as no more sophisticated solution can be devised. My 
impression abroad in Commonwealth countries is that the situation, 
although utterly different in detail, is equally chaotic. Administration 
on the scale required by a modern society can only be achieved by an 
efficient and expensive organisation and this involves the principle of 
public accountability.
This leads me to say that on the continent o f Europe the problem 
has been solved in principle but at a price and in a manner wholly 
different from what would be acceptable in Common Law countries. 
On the continent of Europe judges form part of the civil service. 
They are not part of the practising legal profession. They have 
never been advocates. They often form part of the administrative 
machine being, at least for a time, wholly seconded from judicial 
duties. They are recruited from the law schools of the universities 
on graduation, at about age 27, and move up the ranks of promotion 
as they acquire seniority. They are, to an extent greater than would be 
tolerated in Britain, subject to a Ministry of Justice, with a politician 
at the head, though their positions are fairly secure, and the original 
recruitment is by merit. Contrast this with the British tradition. We 
appoint our judges from the practising profession at about the age of 
forty-five to fifty-five. We seek to do so from m ature advocates with 
successful practices and long experience of court work. I doubt myself 
whether, given the adversarial system of litigation peculiar to Common 
Law countries, any other method of appointment is possible.
But how is it to be effected? Is there to be any, and if so what, 
system of disciplinary control? Is the appointment to be for life, up to a 
retirement age, or is it to be renewable? To what extent, and in what 
sense, are political appointments to be avoided? None o f these questions 
is easily answered. In the United States it is notorious that many 
appointments are by election. No doubt this was due to the feeling 
at the time of the Revolution that appointment by the Crown was 
corrupt. But so is appointment by election, which is achieved by direct 
political influence and canvassing and may be lost if enough, or 
sufficiently influential, disappointed litigants can be found to protest
12 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
at reappointment. Even where election is not involved, the dual system 
of state and federal courts provides a wide difference in the degree 
to which appointments are politically motivated and in the quality of 
appointees. The Supreme Court has, of course, a very high standard, 
but since its judgm ents can directly affect the executive acts of the 
President and the validity of acts of Congress and State legislatures, 
the occasional controversy which surrounds Presidential nomination is 
not without a solid foundation of fact.
British appointments were, until recently, often frankly political. 
The correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Lord Halsbury, not 
less than the contemporary controversy surrounding Lord Halsbury’s 
appointments, establishes that this was so, at any rate until the end of 
the nineteenth century. But in fact the practice continued much longer, 
and even between the wars some appointments were far from being 
above suspicion. It is now, I believe, accepted on all hands that, at 
least since 1945, all paid judicial appointments are impeccably impartial 
and made from the best talent available without regard to political 
leanings. We have now a bench, I believe, of higher average quality 
than ever before in my lifetime, and one which is also markedly less 
political.
In one way this gives rise to a new sort o f problem. W'hen I was 
first called to the Bar a high proportion of High Court Judges, and 
a smaller num ber o f county court judges, had actually been in the 
House of Commons. Personally I regarded, and still regard, this as 
an advantage. I do not myself think that the possession of political 
opinions and political experience is a bar either to judicial office or 
real impartiality. Membership of the House of Commons, which 
necessarily involves close acquaintance with the other side in politics, 
tends to knock off angularities and mitigate prejudice rather than the 
reverse, and this certainly coincides to my mind with my personal 
assessment o f the qualities of my predecessors on the Woolsack who, of 
course, were all overtly political appointments. By far the most politically 
prejudiced have been those with the least experience of public life in 
the House of Commons. I would gladly myself have appointed MPs 
directly from the House to the judicial bench but was unable to do so 
in a single case during my period of office. This is because the 
combination of a first-class practice at the Bar with membership of the 
House o f Commons has been increasingly difficult. The result, I 
believe, has not been altogether happy since it has broken the centuries 
old understanding of our political system on the judicial bench, and the 
understanding o f forensic affairs in the House of Commons. This has 
led to a two-fold misfortune. Judges more often unwittingly ruffle 
the susceptibilities of MPs in their observations from the bench; and the 
increasing practice of fairly unbridled criticism of the bench o f judges 
by members of Parliament and even Ministers (unknown in my youth) 
has led to a fairly widespread belief among MPs that they should be 
in on the act when any controversial decision is made. The result
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has been a flood of ad hoc Bills by private members designed without 
regard to any coherent view of the general issues involved to override 
the effect of particular decisions, and a spate of offensive and 
ill-informed criticisms of the judicial bench both inside and outside 
the House o f Commons.
In the meantime, and for quite different reasons, a marked 
increase has taken place both in the num ber of politically sensitive 
decisions and of the attitude of the judiciary towards them. When I 
was called to the Bar in 1932 it seemed almost as if the Common Law 
had sunk, if not into a decline, at least into a state in which there 
was no more to be said. The great constructive period which began 
about 1860 had come to an end by the beginning of the First World 
War. The great advance of statute although, of course, it had reached 
nothing like its present proportions, was already beginning. Subordinate 
legislation with statutory force, already the subject of a famous book 
by Lord Hewart, was assuming gigantic proportions. At that stage it 
would not, I think, be disrespectful to describe the judiciary as content 
to adopt the role of lions under the throne, maybe even sleeping lions. 
Occasionally a low growl would be heard as in the case of O’Brien 
in about 1922 or 1923, when the Home Secretary exceeded his powers. 
But in the main the judges seemed to accept that Parliament was 
constantly conferring new administrative functions on Ministers and 
other subordinate authorities, and these, it was thought, should make 
their own decisions and pursue their own policies free from judicial 
interference. Perhaps the high water mark of this tendency was reached 
during the last war in the cases under 18B (eg Liversedge v. Anderson) 
and relating to the Crown privilege to withhold confidential information 
and documents (Duncan v. Cammell Laird).
A very different situation presents itself today. This is, of course, 
not primarily the doing of the judges who, after all, do not decide 
what cases come before the Courts, and often do not relish the fact 
that some of them contain a constitutional or political sting in the tail. 
The real cause of the spate of constitutional cases has been the vastly 
increased activity o f the other two branches o f government, executive 
and legislature, intruding or progressing (whichever way you choose to 
look at it) into almost every branch of human society, and the disturbed 
and occasionally explosive social scene which underlies it.
The new mood has covered almost every field o f law, contract 
and tort, evidence, commercial and patent law, shipping, as well as 
constitutional cases. It seems to have begun about 1945 when Mr. 
Justice Denning, whose remarkable judicial career was then just beginning, 
proclaimed his independence of the doctrine of consideration in contract 
and opened up, as he believed, the new and exciting field of promissory 
estoppel. But, since then, decisions in the field of constitutional law 
have become more and more numerous and more and more contro­
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versial. The Divisional Court and the judges o f first instance operating 
the old prerogative writs o f certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and 
the discretionary remedy of declaration, have become more and more 
alert to detect irregularities in the performance of the growing body 
of statutory tribunals, and local boards, and authorities. The doctrine 
of natural justice, long almost dormant, has been creatively received. 
The Court of Appeal has not hesitated to criticise and overthrow 
ministerial decisions, and in the main it has been supported by the 
House o f Lords under the brilliant leadership of Lord Reid, although 
restraining some of the more audacious innovations.
O f course, none of this has occurred without public controversy. 
But, as I have said, an independent judiciary cannot avoid controversy 
in an age o f continuous social change. The flow of controversial 
work never stops. Cases succeed one another about industrial relations, 
squatters, students, immigrants, new religions and philosophies, Cabinet 
memoirs, wireless licences, sewerage rates, the sky train, comprehensive 
schools, foreign compensation, war harm, conspiracy to corrupt public 
morals, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 
even just television personalities and politicians. You name it. The judges 
have to decide it; and whether they refuse the remedy or grant it, 
decline jurisdiction or accept it, they will come in for criticism from 
disappointed litigants, trigger-happy politicians, offended ministers, 
disgruntled trade unions, or angry bosses, and, what is more, they have 
got to take it in silence because they cannot answer back.
O f course, we can all form our own views as to whether this new 
period o f judicial creativity is good or bad, popular or unpopular. 
For what it is worth, my own is that the renewed and increasing 
creativity of the judiciary is to be welcomed and, even where the 
particular manifestations of it have been controversial, far from unpopular. 
If I am right, the public has been growing increasingly restive at 
the encroachments of government, and even of the majority in the 
House of Commons, on individual liberty, and increasingly critical of 
powerful corporations and trade unions in the damage they sometimes 
quite callously inflict on innocent third parties, or even their own 
members, and o f their curious belief that they have a right to deprive 
the public at large of their most basic needs in the ruthless pursuit 
of what they believe to be the sectional interests o f their members. 
It is, I believe, increasingly recognised that judicial independence 
remains one of the few remaining protection? of the individual and 
minority groups against the encroachment o f the bureaucracy and the 
politically motivated jack in office, against the intrusiveness of mass 
culture and the oppressiveness of Unions and great Corporations. 
Individuals and minorities are coming more and more discontented 
at what they regard as the increasing remoteness o f governments, 
the facelessness of modern public companies, and the insensitivity of 
officials or private associations.
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I cannot, of course, prove the assertion I have just made, that all 
this judicial creativity is far from unpopular. But there is one fact to 
which I can point with confidence that goes to show that by and large 
the judges are doing a good job of work. Whenever some public 
scandal, real or imagined, takes place, or some public calamity demands 
investigation, or, more often than not, when controversy breaks out in 
the course of an industrial dispute, or when a commission or committee 
is required to enquire into some proposed legal change, public opinion 
almost inevitably demands, and successive Governments have usually 
ensured, that the investigation is carried out or chaired by a senior 
member of the judiciary; and though judges do not themselves relish 
these additions to their contractual duties, they seldom refuse; and the 
readiness of the public to accept their findings is a tribute to the respect 
in which they are held, no less than to the public spirit which leads 
them to accept a controversial and sometimes dangerous and unpleasant 
task.
This leads me back to the discussion o f the central problem of 
organisation: how to reconcile judicial independence with efficiency and 
public accountability. I use the word “reconcile” advisedly because there 
are high and dry extremists who might argue either for a complete 
separation of powers or complete subordination of the judiciary to the 
secular political leadership and philosophy of the state. That the last is 
in fact the situation in Eastern Europe, and most o f all in the Soviet 
Union, there can be no doubt. In such a case the judiciary remains 
no more than a technical arm of the state equipped with a particular 
expertise, bound to give effect to its philosophy and aims but not able 
to give effect to any objective standards of jurisprudence and justice — 
standards designed to represent values valid independently of the 
particular will of the ruling bloc. I will not expatiate on this situation. 
I believe myself that it is the logical expression of the theory of centralised 
democracy as it is expounded by the theorists of the left and right in 
Western countries. They might not admit it bluntly even to themselves, 
still less to other people. In any event we are still a long way away 
from that.
On the other side of the fence there are those who believe in the 
complete separation o f powers. But these seem to me to fall down at 
two points: appointments and efficiency. The appointment o f judges in 
the end must come from the executive, and the money for the adminis­
tration must be found by Parliament. I have heard it suggested that 
judicial appointments should be made by a committee o f judges or the 
like. But this would make the judges a self perpetuating oligarchy and 
I do not believe in the end that this would be acceptable to public 
opinion or constitutionally correct. Travelling, as I have done from time 
to time, in other jurisdictions, I have seemed to sense that, to the 
extent that this view is held, the court system tends to be starved of 
funds and logistical infrastructures to the point where efficiency is 
seriously impaired. I do not believe that it is feasible to cut the judiciary
16 U.N.B. I A W  JOURNAL
off completely from the political world. Equally I do not believe it is 
entirely worldly-wise to make it self organised and self perpetuating.
When I was Lord Chancellor I was constantly being asked whether, 
in England, we did not need a Ministry of Justice. I always replied 
that, so far as England and Wales were concerned, I regarded myself 
as the Minister o f Justice. But, of course, it all depends on what his 
functions should be. If by a Ministry of Justice is meant that the same 
Minister should have responsibility for the administration of the Courts, 
and the initiation of prosecutions, I violently differ. I saw that system 
at work at the Attorney General’s Department during the war. I also 
believe that the responsibility for penal treatment after sentence and the 
responsibility for the judiciary and the courts are incompatible. I am 
not putting forward the English solution as ideal either in England or 
elsewhere, but there are two mistakes which I believe we have not made. 
Prosecutions are the departm ent o f the Attorney General; penal treat­
ment, of the Home Secretary.
Nevertheless, I believe that there is a case for a Department of 
State concerned entirely with the administration o f justice and the 
judiciary. This Minister would be responsible for the general state of 
jurisprudence and legislation, including the drafting of bills, law reform, 
criminal law and procedure, and the general state of efficiency in the 
courts. O f course Britain is a unitary state, and, with us, no problem 
arises of two separate legal structures, federal and state, as in the 
United States.
The difficulty of such a departm ent is that it is apt to be too 
political. So far, we have avoided this difficulty in England by making 
the Lord Chancellor sit in the House of Lords and not the Commons, 
and by making him take the judicial oath and occasionally sit as a judge 
as well as discharge his other functions. Obviously, other nations 
arrive at other formulae, some by entrenching articles in their constitu­
tions, others by rules of practice designed for the same purpose.
But whatever solution is found, a problem  rem ains which 
democracy must take seriously. The extreme advocates of what I have 
called elective dictatorship are always on about what they conceive to 
be the danger of political judges. There is a real danger here, and I 
hope I have said nothing to suggest that no problem exists. But it is 
nothing like the danger of elective dictatorship to which I have sought 
to point. The moment politicians, whether acting as Ministers or as 
members o f the legislature, set themselves up as wholly above the law, 
they are setting themselves up as above the people whose interests 
they are there to represent, and democracy, as it is understood in the 
West, will cease to exist. The outward mark o f democracy is universal 
suffrage, but its content is political pluralism and a theory of limited 
government. That means the theory which prescribes that government
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may not overstep the bounds set to it by a body of moral values, and, 
if these bounds are to be effective, there must be a strong judiciary 
able to call a halt to the acts of politicians whether these claim to be 
acting as the elected executive or as the legislative body.
Thus, in this lecture I hope to have identified a real need of 
democracy. It is to have a mechanism constantly available to reconcile 
judicial independence and impartiality with public accountability and 
administrative efficiency. Different societies will, of course, create their 
own mechanism compatible with their national traditions and require­
ments. There is no magic in the particular formula o f which I have 
direct experience. But my belief is that democrats the world over pay 
too little attention to the problem and ought to spend more time 
trying to solve it. I do not claim that the solution will win wars or 
prevent revolutions. But as a part o f a stable and civilised society 
it forms a useful and, I would add, necessary part of the mechanism. 
All the more useful and necessary because, at its best, it is liable to 
remain unnoticed.
